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The number of electric vehicles (EV) has increased significantly in the past decades due to its advantages including emission reduction and improved energy efficiency. However, the adoption of EV could lead to overloading the grid and degrading the power quality of the distribution system. It also demands an increase in the number of EV charging stations. To meet the charging needs of 15 million EVs by the year 2030 with limited charging stations, prediction of charging needs, and reallocating charging resources are in emerging needs. In this study, long short-term memory (LSTM) and autoregressive and moving average models (ARMA) models were applied to predict charging loads with temporal profiles from 3 charging stations. Prediction accuracy was applied to evaluate the performance of the models. The LSTM models demonstrated a significant performance improvement compared to ARMA models. The results from this study lay a foundation to efficiently manage charge resources. 

In Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, perception is both security and safety critical. Despite various prior studies on its security issues, all of them only consider attacks on cameraor LiDAR-based AD perception alone. However, production AD systems today predominantly adopt a Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) based design, which in principle can be more robust against these attacks under the assumption that not all fusion sources are (or can be) attacked at the same time. In this paper, we present the first study of security issues of MSF-based perception in AD systems. We directly challenge the basic MSF design assumption above by exploring the possibility of attacking all fusion sources simultaneously. This allows us for the first time to understand how much security guarantee MSF can fundamentally provide as a general defense strategy for AD perception. We formulate the attack as an optimization problem to generate a physically-realizable, adversarial 3D-printed object that misleads an AD system to fail in detecting it and thus crash into it. To systematically generate such a physical-world attack, we propose a novel attack pipeline that addresses two main design challenges: (1) non-differentiable target camera and LiDAR sensing systems, and (2) non-differentiable cell-level aggregated features popularly used in LiDAR-based AD perception. We evaluate our attack on MSF algorithms included in representative open-source industry-grade AD systems in real-world driving scenarios. Our results show that the attack achieves over 90% success rate across different object types and MSF algorithms. Our attack is also found stealthy, robust to victim positions, transferable across MSF algorithms, and physical-world realizable after being 3D-printed and captured by LiDAR and camera devices. To concretely assess the end-to-end safety impact, we further perform simulation evaluation and show that it can cause a 100% vehicle collision rate for an industry-grade AD system. We also evaluate and discuss defense strategies.